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A decision at UNFCCC COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia
December 2007 permitting demonstration activities
gave a green light to reduced emissions from avoided
deforestation and degradation plus (REDD)2 before
any legal agreement on principles, rights, safeguards,
finance, monitoring, reporting and verification was
reached.3 The decision, founded upon a ‘learning
by doing’ ethos, would bring, it was hoped,
important insights from these pilot projects for
negotiators who were involved in developing a legal
architecture for a REDD mechanism within the UN
climate change regime. This knowledge would
complement the mountains of research findings
conducted by economists, lawyers and forest policy
experts within international organisations, including
non-governmental organisations and indigenous
peoples’ networks which has fed into the UNFCCC
process through various channels since COP 13
December 2007. Over the course of two years
numerous new pilot REDD projects were initiated
under different organisations programmes including
the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Fund,
UN-REDD, alongside government schemes (e.g
Norway and Australia), volumes of research and
policy papers written, and hundreds of hours of
meetings on REDD occurred. Much of these efforts
were intended to influence the outcome of the
UNFCCC COP15 at Copenhagen December 2009.
As the final gavel fell closing COP 15 in the early
hours of 19 December 2009 no legally binding
agreement on REDD was reached. The only formal
COP 15 decision adopted in Copenhagen on REDD
extended the initiative for further demonstration
activities. This outcome was expected by many,
although the Copenhagen Accord, a non-UN
agreement which the COP ‘noted’ did surprise
most.4 The earliest a UN decision on the REDD
legal architecture will be taken will now be at COP
16 in Mexico in December 2010.
The REDD articles in this LEAD edition are
representative of a growing body of academic legal
scholarship which explore the numerous law and
policy challenges that a REDD mechanism must
confront including: finance; environmental and social
safeguards (particularly for forest-based
communities); monitoring, reporting and
verification; tenure and property rights, and a
complaints mechanism.  Each of these REDD articles
inquire how particular  legal tools and policies can
assist in resolving specific issues, including  securing
tenure rights and equitable distribution of benefits,
realising co-benefits (particularly development),
creating social safeguards and ensuring participation
of forest peoples. These articles all demonstrate a faith
in international law’s potential to create a framework
within which, along with the talisman of good
governance, can secure all the benefits that REDD
promises. This is akin to the win-win-win formula
which is common to many advocates of neo-liberalist
approaches to the global environmental law.
The remainder of this article will illustrate how
currently within the UNFCCC a win-win-win REDD
formula is far from being guaranteed. It will examine
the effects Copenhagen had on REDD negotiations
and consider the implications more broadly.
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1 See REDD: A New Animal in the Forest, Life Mosaic,
December 2009 film, available at http://
www.lifemosaic.net/filmsforcopenhagen.php.
2 Throughout this article the acronym REDD will be used
to refer to ‘policy approaches and positive incentives on
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation in developing countries; and the
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing
countries’ – increasingly the acronyms REDD-plus or
REDD+ are used to indicate these co-benefits.
3 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing
Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, Decision 2/
CP.13, in Report of the Conference of the Parties,
Thirteenth Session, Bali, 3-15 December 2007, Doc. No.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (2008). available at http://
u n f c c c . i n t / d o c u m e n t a t i o n / d e c i s i o n s / i t e m s /
3597.php?such=j&volltext=2/CP.13#beg.
4 Foundation for International Environmental Law and
Development, REDD-Plus (London: Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development,




At the UNFCCC COP 15 in Copenhagen
December 2009 a few hoped, despite much evidence
to the contrary, that a post-2012 legally binding
agreement would be forthcoming to prevent long
term ‘dangerous anthropogenic climate change’.5
More sceptical observers thought that an agreement
on REDD would be concluded if nothing else. Going
into Copenhagen REDD was tabled on the agenda
of several bodies but most importantly: the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action
(AWG-LCA) and the Subsidiary Body on Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA). The content of
the negotiation texts, along with tabled non-papers,
included many issues: technical (monitoring,
reporting, and verification), financial, environmental
and social safeguards, forest community rights,
carbon property rights, forest definitions and
emission reduction targets. Copenhagen produced
no legally binding agreement on REDD. It did result
however in a decision on methodology, extended
the mandate of the AWG-LCA to continue
negotiations including on an agreed REDD text, and
‘took note of’ the surprise ‘politically binding’
Copenhagen Accord.
The political effect and future legal significance, both
within the UN climate regime and elsewhere, of the
Copenhagen Accord has already prompted a great
deal of debate. It may have an important impact on
the future manner in which the UNFCCC regime
functions. The Copenhagen Accord was drafted by
28 countries (constituting over 85 per cent of historic
and current global greenhouse gas emissions) during
the final hours of COP 15 in December 2009. In the
closing COP Plenary Parties agreed, although with
great bitterness expressed by some countries, to take
note of the Accord.6 The implications of this are
that the Copenhagen Accord is not legally binding,
and as such remains a political diplomatic
document.7 Regardless of this it is important to
examine the Copenhagen Accord as it may have
important ramifications for the overall climate
change agreement/s, including a REDD mechanism,
in the next couple of years.
The next section will provide an assessment of the
UNFCCC COP15 REDD related outcomes on the
following key issues: principles, targets, finance,
social and environmental safeguards. There is no
separate section on a REDD complaints mechanism
as Copenhagen made no contribution to the
developments necessary on this issue. A brief
speculation on the effect of Copenhagen on the
preparatory meetings for UNFCCC COP 16 in
Mexico provides a conclusion.
3
PRINCIPLES
Principles underpin any legal mechanism and are
central to the normative interpretation which is
given in its implementation. The UNFCCC has as
its normative basis a number of key principles.8 At
Copenhagen guiding ‘principles’ within an
international REDD mechanism were relegated to
the non-operative section of the AWG-LCA’s
ongoing negotiating text.9 The bracketed text which
states that Parties affirm that the following
[principles][principles and provisions of the
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5 Id.
6 These included Columbia, Bolivia and Tuvalu.
7 Jacob Werksman, ‘Taking Note’ of the Copenhagen Accord:
What it Means? (Washington DC: World Resources
Institute, 2009), available at http://www.wri.org/stories/
2009/12/taking-note-copenhagen-accord-what-it-means.
8 Article 3, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro9 May 1992 31 Int’l Leg.
Mat.  849 (1992).
9 See Paragraph 1 of Policy Approaches and Positive
Incentives on Issues Relating to Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing
Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon
Stocks in Developing Countries, Draft decision -/CP.15,
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative
Action under the UNFCCC, Doc. No.  FCCC/
AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.6 (2009). available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/l07a06.pdf.
Convention] guide the implementation of activities
brackets ‘principles’ in reference to the UNFCCC
convention. Further in the text certain principles are
re-emphasised including: sovereignty and sustainable
development.10 Common but differentiated
responsibility is not cited. Although under the rules
of international law any UNFCCC REDD
mechanism would be subject to the principles which
are a key operative component of that Convention
restatement of such principles, as was done in the
Kyoto Protocol, provides further weight to their
importance in the interpretation of an agreement.11
This would similarly apply to REDD under the
Copenhagen Accord if it is incorporated into the
UNFCCC regime. The Copenhagen Accord does not
explicitly state anything in terms of principles under
REDD. It does however state that it is ‘guided by the
principles of the Convention’, and also includes
references to common but differentiated
responsibility, equity, sustainable development and
sovereignty throughout the text.12
The challenge remains of embedding the principles
within a UN REDD mechanism. As the number of
‘demonstration’ REDD activities initiated
throughout tropical developing countries rises it
becomes increasingly difficult to ensure that key
principles underpin them.  Efforts to create effective
safeguards, particularly social ones, are making some
headway although still appear to be inadequate in a
number of important ways.
4
TARGETS
International disagreement remains regarding what
temperature increase will enable all humankind to
avoid ‘dangerous anthropogenic climate change’.13
The Copenhagen Accord states that keeping any rise
‘below 2 degrees Celsius’ is necessary.14 It is
recognised that ‘deep cuts in emissions are required’
in order to hold to this temperature rise.15 The
Copenhagen Accord invites countries to pledge
quantified economy wide emissions targets for 2020
if an Annex 1 country or to outline their nationally
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) which will
be taken by 31 January 2010.16 The Copenhagen
Accord does not specify targets for GHG emissions
reductions for any sector including forestry.
The Barcelona session Report of the AWG-LCA
contained the main negotiating text on REDD at
Copenhagen.17 The Report included a proposed
target to ‘reduce gross deforestation in developing
countries by at least 50 per cent by 2020 compared
to current levels’.18 As approximately 20 per cent
of total GHG emissions result from deforestation
and degradation a 50 per cent reduction would
contribute significantly to climate change mitigation
efforts.19 This target, which was bracketed in the
text prior to COP15, was not included in the final
text.20 REDD targets were part and parcel of the
entire emissions reductions targets endgame, as one
NGO representative stated ‘It’s hardly surprising
that developing countries won’t agree to commit to
global targets for reductions in deforestation, when
rich countries aren’t prepared to commit to global
targets for reductions of industrial emissions and
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10 Id. Paragraphs 1(d) and 1(e).
11 Article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises,
Vienna, 23 May 1969, 8 Int’l Leg. Mat. 679 (1969), available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
12 Copenhagen Accord, Draft Decision -/CP.15,
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCC, Fifteenth
Session, Copenhagen, 7-18 December 2009, Doc. No.
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (2009).
13 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, note 8 above, Article 2.
14 See Copenhagen Accord, note 12 above, Paragraph 1.
15 Id. Paragraph 2.
16 Id. Paragraphs 4 and 5; Appendix I and II.
17 See Annex 3(C), in Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention, Seventh Session, Bangkok, 28 September -
9 October 2009, and Barcelona from 2 to 6 November




19 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, The
Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007).
20 Any item or language that has not been agreed to by the
time the UN meeting is held appears in bracketed text in
the conference documents.
adequate financial commitments.21 It is this text that
will be carried forward into the next session of the
newly mandated AWG-LCA in Bonn, June 2010.22
5
FINANCE
Prior to Copenhagen finance for REDD totalled
$4.12 billion USD, the bulk of this came from the
Norwegian Forest and Climate Initiative.23 This falls
far short of the Elisach Review’s estimation of $17.33
USD billion per annum by 2020 required to achieve
a 50 per cent reduction in global deforestation, a
figure which was seen by many as a substantial
underestimation.24 As the articles in this LEAD
journal emphasise finance remains one of the central
issues in how any REDD mechanism is to function.
Firstly the generation of finance and whether it is
through a trust fund, a market mechanism or some
kind of hybridisation continues to be negotiated.
Secondly how funds will be distributed under which
ever mechanism is decided upon is a complex
technical legal question but also one which touches
on the underlying principles such as equity, common
but differentiated responsibilities, sovereignty and
sustainable development.
The Copenhagen Accord refers directly to REDD,
and specifically on financing the mechanism. It
recognises ‘the crucial role of reducing emission from
deforestation and forest degradation and the need
to enhance removal of greenhouse gas emission by
forests and agree on the need to provide positive
incentives to such actions through the immediate
establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus,
to enable the mobilisation of financial resources from
developed countries’ [emphasis added].25 Various
approaches are decided upon, ‘including
opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-
effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions
[emphasis added].26 The aim being to provide ‘scaled
up, new and additional, predictable and adequate
funding as well as improved access’ to developing
countries. ‘The collective commitment by developed
countries is [given] to provide new and additional
resources, including forestry’ ... ‘approaching USD
30 billion for the period 2010-2012’.27 The Accord
further states based on the condition of ‘meaningful
mitigation actions and transparency on
implementation [by developing countries],
developed countries [will] commit to a goal of
mobilising jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by
2020 to address the needs of developing countries.
This funding will come from a wide variety of
sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral,
including alternative sources of finance. New
multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered
through effective and efficient fund arrangements,
with a governance structure providing for equal
representation of developed and developing
countries. A significant portion of such funding
should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate
Fund’.28 The Parties to the Copenhagen Accord
agreed to it being ‘operational immediately’.29 Other
than individual pledges by governments this was the
only commitment to REDD funding which
occurred during the Copenhagen. All decisions on
finance within the UNFCCC were deferred until
COP 16 2010.
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21 See Accra Caucus on Forests and Climate Change, Press
Release, 13 December 2009, available at http://
malumnalu.blogspot.com/2009/12/accra-caucus-on-
forests-and-climate_13.html.
22 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention, UNFCCC Draft Decision -/CP.15,
Copenhagen, 18 December 2009, available  http://
unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/
cop15_lca_auv.pdf.
23 Global Canopy Programme, The Little Climate Finance
Book: A Guide to Financing Options for Forests and
Climate Change (UK: Global Canopy Programme, 2009),
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/
download/4619.pdf.
24 Johan Eliasch, Climate Change: Financing Global Forests
- The Eliasch Review (London: Earthscan, 2008).
25 See Copenhagen Accord, note 12 above, Paragraph 6.
26 Id. Paragraph 7.
27 Id. Paragraph 8.
28 Id. Paragraph 8.
29 Id. Preamble.
be reported through their national
communications every two years.
Non-Annex I Parties will
communicate information on the
implementation of their actions
through National Communications,
with provisions for international
consultations and analysis under
clearly defined guidelines that will
ensure that national sovereignty is
respected...[However, financially]
‘supported nationally appropriate
mitigation actions [NAMAs] will be
subject to international measurement,
reporting and verification in
accordance with guidelines adopted
by the Conference of the Parties’.33
Most REDD countries are non-Annex I Parties; as
such they would be responsible for bi-annual MRV
national communications on domestic action.
Developing country parties were charged by COP15
‘to establish, according to national circumstances and
capabilities, robust and transparent national forest
monitoring systems and, if appropriate, sub-national
systems as part of national monitoring systems’34
Under the non-decision text of the AWG-LCA
SBSTA is requested to undertake a programme of
work on methodological issues.35 As this decision
was not adopted by the COP15 a number of
procedural questions remain as to whether this
working group will form.
The Copenhagen Accord also outlines that any
‘financially supported NAMAs’ will be subject to
international MRV guidelines yet to be decided by
the COP. Currently the majority of REDD activities
are financed by developed country parties and/or
international organisations. Assuming this pattern
continues the responsibility for environmental
6
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS
Another key aspect to REDD is ensuring its
environmental integrity. To achieve environmental
integrity a number of factors must be realised:
baselines must be agreed; project, national and
international, ‘leakage’ be prevented; a level of
‘permanence’ must be guaranteed and projects must
not be ‘additional’ to ‘business as usual’ scenarios
within the forestry and land use sector. The technical
obstacles to ensuring these are immense. The
uncertainties on these issues were core to the
exclusion of REDD from the UNFCCC legal regime
negotiations prior to 2007. Despite important
scientific and technical improvements uncertainties
remain which could compromise the environmental
integrity of any REDD sub-national project or
national programme. The uncertainties and
consequent questions of accuracy of emissions
reductions claims have important implications for
the design of both an international REDD legal
framework and related national regulations,
especially in terms of liability for claimed emission
reductions.  Investments in REDD ‘readiness’30
frequently focus on establishing the necessary
institutional, knowledge and skills base within developing
countries to undertake effective MRVs.31 Yet all too
often MRV negotiations are narrowly focused on
carbon calculation levels. However, to guarantee the
co-benefits, which a REDD-plus mechanism is
intended, it is necessary that non-carbon
environmental safeguards are included in MRV.32
The Copenhagen Accord states that:
Mitigation actions taken by Non-
Annex I Parties will be subject to their
domestic measurement, reporting and
verification the result of which will
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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30 ‘readiness’ applies to the considered necessary preparatory
investments to ensure that a REDD project at either
national or sub-national level will be effective in reducing
deforestation and degradation.
31 Most notably UN REDD.
32 Personnel comment by Kate Dooley, FERN, 28 January
2010.
33 See Copenhagen Accord, note 12 above, Paragraph 5.
34 See Paragraph 1(d) of  Methodological Guidance for
Activities Relating to Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of
Conservation,  Sustainable Management of Forests and
Enhancement of Forest  Carbon Stocks in Developing
Countries, UNFCCC Draft decision -/CP.15,
Copenhagen, 18 December 2009, available at http://
unfccc.int/files/na/application/pdf/cop15_ddc_auv.pdf.
35 Id. Paragraph 15.
integrity oversight for REDD projects in developing
countries could largely fall to an international body.
Existing projects are MRV by institutional bodies
which are involved such as the World Bank, UN or
NGOs.  To ensure environmental integrity and
consistency of REDD projects it is necessary that
environmental safeguards are agreed upon and a
governance approach to implement them is finalised
as soon as possible in a manner which is inclusive of
those directly impacted by the mitigation activities
such as forest peoples. The evidence to date is not
encouraging in this regard.36
7
SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS
In the only reference to forest peoples role in MRV
a COP15 decision ‘Encourages [developing
countries], as appropriate, the development of
guidance for effective engagement of indigenous
peoples and local communities in monitoring and
reporting’37 This single ‘encouragement’, and only
under the discretion of when ‘appropriate’, to
develop guidance falls far short of ensuring the rights
of indigenous peoples and forest communities which
are outlined in the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).38 Where language
is contained in UNFCCC REDD related documents
on social safeguards, including references to
participation, tenure and property rights, it tends
to be weak and frequently up to the discretion of
States to implement. Within the UNFCCC the haste
to ensure environmental integrity has resulted in
scant attention being given to the importance of
rights based social safeguards, leading to a discourse
developing, reminiscent of cost-benefit analysis
approaches to environmental decision making,
evaluating the necessary trade-offs between forest
people’s rights and climate change.39
The non-decision AWG-LCA REDD text by the
closing of COP 15 did recognise that ‘Respect for
the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and
members of local communities, by taking into
account relevant international obligations, national
circumstances and laws’, ‘should be
promoted’[emphasis added].40 It also noted that ‘the
General Assembly has adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People’.41
A ‘request’ is made of developing country Parties
who develop and implement a national (or sub-
national) REDD plan to ‘address, inter alia, drivers
of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure
issues, forest governance issues, gender
considerations and ... ensuring the full and effective
participation of relevant stakeholders, inter alia,
indigenous peoples and local communities’
[emphasis added].42 Given the vague and imprecise
language being adopted in these draft UNFCCC
texts, and also that the focus of the Copenhagen
Accord itself is primarily finance and environmental
safeguards, there is legitimate cause for concern for
the substantive and procedural rights of indigenous
peoples and forest communities’ social safeguards.
It is likely that the short sighted failure to prioritise
social safeguards will back fire and result in less than
effective (economically and environmentally)
REDD projects, and also unnecessary suffering by
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36 Victoria  Corpuz-Tauli, Statement by the Chair of the
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues on the
occasion of the Launch of the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility, Bali, Indonesia, 10 December 2007, available at
www.forestpeoples.org/documents/forest_issues/
unpfii_statement_fcpf_dec07_eng.pdf.
37 See Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation and the Role of Conservation,  Sustainable
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest
Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries, note 34 above,
Paragraph 3. The draft decision also include in the
preamble  ‘Recognizing the need for full and effective
engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities
in, and the potential contribution of their knowledge to,
monitoring and reporting of activities relating to decision
1/CP.13, paragraph 1 (b) (iii)’; Id. Preamble.
38 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
People, New York, 13 September 2007, UN Doc. A/
RES/61/295 (2007).
39 Frances Seymour, ‘Forests, Climate Change and Human
Rights: Managing Risks and Trade-offs’,  in Stephen
Humphreys ed., Human Rights and Climate Change, 207,
229 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
40 See Draft decision -/CP.15, note 9 above, Paragraph 2(C).
41 Id.  Paragraph 2(C).
42 Id. Paragraph 6.
impoverished indigenous and local forest
communities.43 Increasingly the full and effective
participation of forest based communities is
understood to be fundamental to any REDD
programme realising the objectives of reduced
emissions, along with the co-benefits of ecosystems
protection and poverty alleviation.44 There may be
no place for trade-offs.
8
CONCLUSION
UNFCCC COP 15 produced no legally binding
agreement. Within the UNFCCC few substantive
decisions were taken. The two AWG on LCA and
KP were given a mandate to continue deliberations.
As this article illustrates in terms of REDD the
ongoing text for the AWG-LCA is a castrated version
of that which entered COP 15; losing targets,
substantive language on indigenous peoples and
forest communities rights and weakening safeguards.
The Copenhagen Accord language relating to REDD
emphasises market based financial mechanisms and
Law, Environment and Development Journal
environmental safeguards. A SBSTA decision also
continued to encourage REDD demonstration
activities.45
In the coming months before UNFCCC COP16 in
Mexico numerous meetings both within the
UNFCCC and externally will take place. Prior to
31 January 2010 countries wishing to submit targets
and/or NAMAs for the Copenhagen Accord need
to do so.46 This has led certain country groupings
to meet before hand including the EU (15 January
2010)  and the BASIC group on 24 January 2010.47
Other countries less supportive of the Copenhagen
Accord aligned with Bolivia which announced in
January its intention to host a Peoples’ World
Conference on Climate Change and Mother Earth’s
Rights on 20 to 22 April 2010. All these high-level
governmental meetings will discuss a REDD legal
mechanism and how best to move forward regarding
the issues covered in this article. There are other
important fora for the development of REDD such
as UNREDD, the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility, several prominent organisations such as the
International Tropical Timber Organisation, the
Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN Forum
on Forests and the UN Convention on Biological
Diversity. However it may be the private sector
initiatives which need the closest scrutiny as their
activities are often less open to the public gaze.
Copenhagen COP15 will go down in history for
what is yet to be determined. For many observers
and delegations it was a missed opportunity to agree
on deep emissions cuts of greenhouse gases across
all sectors that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic climate change for all countries. The
win-win-win outcome that the REDD articles in this
LEAD edition optimistically believed was possible
assuming appropriate rights and safeguards were put
110
43 See ‘Indonesia Warns of REDD Carbon Cowboys’,
Jakarta Post, 26, October 2009, available at http://
w w w . c a r b o n p o s i t i v e . n e t /
viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1700. See also EFF Calls on
Government of PNG, Development Partners and
AusAID to Protect PNG from Carbon Scams, Eco-
Forestry Forum, available at http://www.redd-
monitor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/
EFF_PNG_REDD_advertisement.pdf.
44 See Tom Griffiths, Seeing RED: Avoided Deforestation
and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities 10 (UK: Forest Peoples Program, 2007),
available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/
ifi_igo/seeing_redd_update_draft_3dec08_eng.pdf;
L.Peskett et al., Making REDD Work for the Poor
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008),available
at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2580.pdf
; CCBA and Care International, Draft REDD+ Social and
Environmental Standards, 2 October 2009, available at
h t t p : / / w w w . i l l e g a l - l o g g i n g . i n f o / u p l o a d s /
REDDSEdraft100209.pdf ; Global Witness, Building
Confidence in REDD: Monitoring Beyond Carbon,
December 2009, available at http://
www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/869/en/
building_confidence_in_redd_monitoring_beyond_carb.
45 See Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation and the Role of Conservation,  Sustainable
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest
Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries, Draft decision
-/CP.15, Copenhagen, 18 December 2009, available
h t tp : //un fccc . in t/ f i l e s /na/app l i c a t ion/pd f/
cop15_ddc_auv.pdf.
46 See Copenhagen Accord, note 12 above, Paragraphs 4
and 5.
47 BASIC – Brazil, South Africa, India and China.
in place is not immediately on the horizon. But
history is a fickle judge and in the longer term
Copenhagen COP15’s legacy may be more generous.
This remains to be seen, and is by no means
guaranteed.48
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48 Simone Lovera, ‘REDD Realities’, in Edgardo Lander et
al eds., Contours of Climate Justice – Ideas for Shaping New
Climate and Energy Politics (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld
Foundation, Critical Currents No. 6, 2009).
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